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Abstract
A benchmark result in the political economy of taxation is that the degree
of redistribution is positively linked to income inequality. However, empirical
evidence supporting such a relationship turns out to be mixed. This paper shows
how these different empirical reactions can be rationalized within a simple model
of tax avoidance and costly tax enforcement. By focussing on structure induced
equilibria in which taxpayers vote over the size of the income tax and the level of
tax enforcement, we show that higher inequality may well decrease the extent of
redistribution, depending on two opposing effects: the standard political effect
and a negative tax base effect working through increases in the average level of
tax avoidance and the share of enforcement expenditures in total tax revenue.
Keywords Tax avoidance, Voting, Redistribution
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1. Introduction
A benchmark result in the political economy of taxation is that the extent
of income redistribution rises if the mean to median income ratio increases
(Meltzer and Richard, 1981). A substantial body of research builds upon this
result. However, empirical evidence regarding the link between inequality and
the extent of income redistribution remains inconclusive: whereas Meltzer and
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Richard (1983) find evidence in favor of a negative relation between the mean to
median income ratio and redistribution, the findings of more recent studies point
to the opposite (Rodriguez, 1999; Kenworthy and McCall, 2008; Georgiadis and
Manning, 2012). According to these studies, a rise in income skewness is often
accompanied by a cut-back in the welfare state.1 The aim of this paper is to
rationalize these opposing findings within a simple model of tax avoidance and
costly tax enforcement.
Both legal tax avoidance and the costs of taxation are economically signif-
icant. According to Slemrod (2007), the US income tax gap amounts to more
than 15% of the estimated actual (paid plus unpaid) tax liability. Similarly, for
Germany, the revenue loss equals one third of all income taxes actually paid
(Lang et al., 1997). Regarding the costs of taxation, Evans (2003) notes that
taxpayers’s compliance costs are typically somewhere between 2% and 10% of
total revenue while administrative costs are around 1% of total revenue.2 Be-
sides the economic significance, the relevance of tax avoidance for the political
problem has recently been emphasized by Roine (2006) and Traxler (2012).3
Specifically, when it comes to redistributive taxation, the presence of tax avoid-
ance may not only give rise to atypical coalitions supporting higher taxes (‘ends
against the middle’) but it will also affect the welfare properties of the vot-
ing outcome. However, none of these papers explicitly addresses the relation
between inequality and redistribution in the context of tax avoidance. Further-
more, the costs of taxation and enforcement have mostly been neglected in these
models.4 To close these gaps in the literature is the aim of the present paper.
We set up a simple model of tax avoidance in the spirit of Slemrod (1994).
Individuals decide on costly and riskless activities that minimize their tax li-
ability. Examples of such activities might be shifting of income into untaxed
fringe benefits, into preferentially-taxed capital gains, or into the future, e.g., via
pension plans (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002). The particularity of the present
model is twofold. First, we explicitly account for the costs of tax enforcement.
Second, and in contrast to most of the existing literature, we study majority
1A prominent example is the first Reagan tax cut which decreased income taxes at a time
when the mean-to-median income ratio was rising steadily.
2See also Sandford et al. (1989), Slemrod (1990) and OECD (2013) who highlight the
economic significance of these costs relative to other public costs.
3See also Borck (2004), Borck (2009) and Traxler (2009) for models with illegal tax evasion
instead of legal avoidance.
4See Traxler (2012) for an exception. His analysis, however, focusses on the welfare impli-
cations when there is sequential majority voting over enforcement and taxes.
2
voting over a linear income tax schedule and the level of tax enforcement when
avoidance is endogenous. Hence, the voting space is two-dimensional implying
that the existence of a Condorcet winner of the majority voting game is not
guaranteed. To deal with this characteristic of the game, we make use of the
concept of structure induced equilibria (Shepsle, 1979).
The model allows us to explain the opposing empirical findings on the
Meltzer-Richard hypothesis. Specifically, we show that for a given level of tax
enforcement, the degree of income redistribution increases with inequality in line
with the predictions of the standard model. However, endogenizing the level of
tax enforcement introduces an additional effect through changes in the tax base
which tends to decrease redistribution: if inequality leads to an increase in the
mass of voters with low income abilities and voting for higher tax rates, the
tax-base will decrease as average tax avoidance increases. Also, the share of en-
forcement expenditures in total tax revenue rises as low income taxpayers vote
for a higher level of tax enforcement to increase the effectiveness of the new tax
rate. However, since tax enforcement is costly, the amount of redistribution that
could be financed with the same income tax rate will be smaller. Such a negative
relationship between income inequality and the tax base is supported by recent
empirical evidence: Aizenman and Jinjarak (2012) find that an increase in the
Gini coefficient of inequality by 1 (in a scale of 0-100), is associated with a lower
tax base of 2% of GDP. Similarly, using a panel of 17 OECD countries between
1975 and 2005, Milasi (2013) reports evidence of a negative relationship between
the concentration of income at the top and budget revenues. The (standard)
political effect and the tax-base effect thus have opposite signs. Redistribution
would decrease as a consequence of higher inequality if, and only if, the tax-base
effect dominates the political effect. This, in turn, depends on the sensitivity of
public and private costs of taxation to the enforcement level.
Our work relates to simple majority voting models that are widely used
to capture political feedback effects, see e.g. Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and
Persson and Tabellini (1994) who argue that inequality depresses growth be-
cause anticipated redistributive taxation reduces the incentive to accumulate
capital. Due to the mixed empirical evidence on the Meltzer-Richard hypothe-
sis, however, some studies have advocated the use of more sophisticated models
of redistribution based on the behavior of politicians or special interest groups
(Gouveia and Masia, 1998). By contrast, this paper shows that the implications
of simple majority voting models are not necessarily rejected by the empirical
evidence described above. Similar conclusions have recently been reached by
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Bredemeier (2013) and DeFreitas (2012). However, the explanations of these
papers differ from ours: while Bredemeier (2013) proposes a standard majority-
voting model with imperfect information5, DeFreitas (2012) studies the tax mix
between direct and indirect taxes when individuals may evade taxation by sup-
plying labour to an informal sector.6 In contrast to these studies, the present
paper provides a complementary explanation based on behavioral responses and
politico-economic consequences of tax avoidance and enforcement.
Our work also relates to the literature analyzing the effects of tax avoidance
on income redistribution and the efficiency properties of majority voting out-
comes over a linear income tax schedule, see Roine (2006) and Traxler (2012).
Our contribution relative to these papers lies in extending the majoritarian vot-
ing game to a bidimensional issue space such that individuals do not only vote
over the tax schedule but also over the level of tax enforcement. Hence, the
focus of this paper is on structure induced equilibria which have, for exam-
ple, been studied by Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2003), Conde-Ruiz and Galasso
(2005) and Bethencourt and Galasso (2008) in the context of inter- and intra-
generational redistributive programmes such as social security, early retirement
or public health. Our model complements these papers by modeling the role of
tax avoidance and enforcement and its determinants in politico-economic equi-
librium. In particular, our analysis explicitly accounts for the costs of taxation
and tax enforcement, an issues that has mostly been neglected in theoretical
analysis.
An empirical application reveals that our model can explain why two major
US tax reforms, the Reagan tax cut in 1981 and the Clinton tax increase in 1993,
have opposite signs even though income inequality has been steadily increasing
in the late 70s as well as in the early 90s. More precisely, we suggest that
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA) substantially improved the effectiveness of
tax enforcement which in turn broadened the tax base and thus strengthened
political support for higher tax rates and higher levels of enforcement.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the
model. Section 3 sets up the voting game and Section 4 solves for the politico-
economic equilibrium and analyzes its properties. Section 5 provides empirical
5Specifically, if an agent’s preferred income tax rate depends on the perception of average
rather than actual productivity, changes in income affect the income distribution by shifting
voting power through income misperceptions in the voting game.
6Her findings, which are based on numerical simulations, point to a non-monotonic rela-
tionship between inequality and redistribution.
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evidence to support the theoretical results of our model and Section 6 concludes.
All proofs are in the Appendix.
2. The economy
Consider an economy that is populated by a mass-1 continuum of taxpayers
with utility U(c), U ′ > 0 > U ′′, where c denotes consumption. Each taxpayer
has an exogenous income, y, distributed on the support
[
y, y
] ∈ <+ according
to a cumulative density function (cdf) F (y) with mean y˜.
The government redistributes income equally among the total population
through a constant income transfer which is financed through a linear personal
income tax τ . However, taxpayers can reduce their tax liability by engaging in
costly activities. The government knows the existence of those activities and
uses a portion of the tax collection to deter tax avoidance by financing a certain
level of tax enforcement, e, which subsumes any costly activities that broaden
the tax base. Thus, the (non-tax-deductible) costs for avoiding taxes are given
by K(a, e, y) which depend on the amount of evaded taxes a, on individual in-
come y and on the government’s level of tax enforcement e. Following Traxler
(2012), avoidance costs are increasing and strictly convex in a and e. Further-
more, we assume that higher income makes avoidance less costly and therefore
more attractive at the margin, i.e. Kay < 0 (Slemrod, 2001).7 Specifically,
in order to obtain closed-form solutions, we consider a generalization of the
standard functional form developed by Slemrod (1994):8
K(a, e, y) = κ
(
a1+γe1+δ
yγ
)
(1)
with κ > 0, γ > 0, δ > 0. A taxpayer’s budget constraint is thus
c = y − τ(y − a)− κ
(
a1+γe1+δ
yγ
)
+ g (2)
7Since wealthy individuals have a lot of disposable income that is not needed to satisfy
primary needs, they can invest it in activities leading to a reduction in their tax liabilities
(such as pension plans, schemes that are aimed at allowing businesses to thrive. etc.). Gravelle
(2013), e.g., argues that one of the main sources of international tax avoidance comes from
the wealthy individual investors who set up secret bank accounts in tax haven countries. The
reason is that high income individuals can afford to better information and tax consultants to
avoid taxes more easily and successfully. Furthermore, the common conjecture that higher-
income receivers have access to more tax avoidance strategies is supported by the evidence in
Lang et al. (1997).
8See also Slemrod (2001) for similar specifications.
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where g denotes a lump-sum transfer.
Optimal avoidance a is characterized by
a =
(
τ
κ(1 + γ)e1+δ
)1/γ
y (3)
which is increasing in the income level y and the tax rate τ and decreasing in
the enforcement level e.
The budget-balancing transfer is given by tax revenues net of enforcement
costs
g = τ
∫ y
y
(y − a) dF − φ(e) (4)
where φ(e) denotes the amount of public revenues that the government needs
to provide a tax enforcement level e. Following Sandmo (1981), we assume
φ′ > 0 and φ′′ > 0. 9 Specifically, we use the following simple functional form:
φ(e) = e1+η1+η , where η > 0. Therefore,
g = τ y˜
(
1−
(
τ
κ(1 + γ)e1+δ
)1/γ)
− e
1+η
1 + η (5)
Taxpayers’ preference relations over taxes and enforcement expenditures are
characterized by their indirect utility function:
V (τ, e) = U
(
y
[
1−
(
1
κe1+δ
)1/γ (
τ
1 + γ
)(1+γ)/γ]
+ τ(y˜ − y)
[
1−
(
τ
κ(1 + γ)e1+δ
)1/γ]
− e
1+η
1 + η
)
(6)
3. The voting game
The personal income tax rate τ and the level of tax enforcement e are de-
cided by the agents through a political system of majoritarian voting. Each
individual casts a ballot over τ and e. Individual preferences over the two issues
are represented by the indirect utility function at Eq. (6). Notice that every
agent has zero mass, and thus no individual vote could change the outcome of
the election. Hence, we assume that individuals vote sincerely. The important
9The assumption that the government incurs convex costs in order to ensure a certain level
of tax enforcement is in line with the literature on optimal taxation, see also Slemrod and
Yitzhaki (1987).
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characteristic of this majoritarian voting game is that the issue space is bidimen-
sional, (τ, e), and thus a Nash equilibrium may fail to exist. To deal with this
feature, we analyze structure induced equilibria, due to Shepsle (1979), which
reduces the game to a static issue-by-issue voting game.
To characterize the equilibria of this voting game, we apply the result in
Shepsle (1979) [Theorem 3.1] to obtain sufficient conditions for a (structure
induced) equilibrium to exist. In particular, if preferences are single-peaked
along every dimension of the issue space, a sufficient condition for (τ∗, e∗) to
be an equilibrium of the voting game is that τ∗ represents the outcome of a
majority voting over the jurisdiction τ , when the other dimension is fixed at its
level e∗, and viceversa.10
Thus, to apply Shepsle (1979)’s theorem to our environment, we need to
ensure that individuals’ preferences are single peaked along the two dimensions,
τ and e. The following lemma describes a set of sufficient conditions.
Lemma 1. If y <
(
1+γ
γ
)
y˜, then individuals’ preferences are single peaked over
τ for given e and over e for given τ .
We therefore restrict the support of income type of individuals, in order to
have that y ∈ (y,
(
1+γ
γ
)
y˜).11
4. Politico-economic equilibria
In this section, individual votes over each dimension of the issue space, τ and
e, are examined issue-by-issue. Voters cast a ballot over τ , for a given level of e,
and viceversa. For each dimension, τ and e, votes are then ordered to identify
the median vote, which, by Shepsle (1979)’s theorem, represents the structure
induced equilibrium outcome of the voting game.
4.1. Voting on the tax rate and the enforcement level
Consider first voting over the personal income tax rate. For a given level
of enforcement, e, a taxpayer with income y would choose her most preferred
10See Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a simple explanation of how to calculate a structure
induced equilibrium.
11Note that we could equivalently put some mild restrictions on γ. Furthermore, for y ≥( 1+γ
γ
)
y˜, it can be shown that indirect utility is monotonically decreasing in τ which in turn
implies that rich individuals will always prefer zero taxation and hence no enforcement.
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income tax rate τ(e) by maximizing her indirect utility (see Eq. (6)) with
respect to τ . The next lemma characterizes the outcome of this vote.
Lemma 2. The most preferred tax rate by any type-y individual is
τ(e) = max
0, κ(1 + γ)e1+δ
 y˜ − y(
1+γ
γ
)
y˜ − y
γ (7)
The preferred tax rate is decreasing in y, i.e. ∂τ(e)∂y < 0 and increasing in e, i.e.
∂τ(e)
∂e > 0.
Lemma 2 states that richer individuals, y > y˜ vote for zero taxes, whereas
poorer individuals, y < y˜, vote for positive tax rates. This finding resembles the
well known fact that a progressive redistributive transfer program characterized
by flat transfers and a linear income tax hurts relatively richer individuals. In
the present model, however, tax avoidance decreases the effective contributions
and, as high income agents have lower costs of avoidance, this reduction will be
larger for richer than for poorer taxpayers, thereby reducing the progressiveness
of the system. As a result, some rich individuals might become net beneficiaries
of the system and have incentives to vote for positive taxes. However, as the
marginal cost of avoidance is positive, this cost is larger for richer taxpayers with
high levels of avoidance, which in turn reduces their interest in the redistributive
program. Thus, when a taxpayer casts a ballot over the program he not only
takes into account the effective contribution but also the cost of avoidance.
The total effective cost incurred by a taxpayer, C, equals the effective con-
tribution plus the cost of avoidance12, i.e.,
C = τ (y − a) +K = τy
(
1−
(
γ
1 + γ
)(
τ
κ(1 + γ)e1+δ
)1/γ)
with
∂C
∂τ
= y
(
1−
(
τ
κ(1 + γ)e1+δ
)1/γ)
= y − a ≥ 0 and ∂
(
∂C
∂τ
)
∂y
> 0.
12Note that if there was no tax avoidance, the total cost of paying taxes would equal the
contribution to the transfer program (the statutory contribution), τy. If the amount of tax
avoidance is positive, however, the cost of paying taxes, C, is lower than the the statutory
contribution, C < τy, indicating that tax avoidance is indeed a profitable activity.
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The effective cost of paying taxes increases with the tax rate and, more impor-
tantly, the marginal cost is higher for richer than for poorer taxpayers. There-
fore, richer taxpayers suffer relatively higher effective costs of paying taxes, and
so, they always vote for zero tax rates. In other words, the gain of lower con-
tributions to the redistributive program due to tax avoidance is offset by an
increase in the marginal cost of avoidance, thereby leaving the progressiveness
of the tax system unchanged.
Finally, an increase in the level of tax enforcement has two opposing effects:
the reduction in the size of the redistributive program due to a smaller share
of public revenues devoted to finance income transfers must be balanced with a
positive effect on public revenues through a decrease in the level of tax avoidance.
As the net effect turns out to be positive, taxpayers’ incentives to vote for higher
tax rates increase.
It is now straightforward, for a given level of tax enforcement, to order
every agent’s vote over the size of the redistributive program and to identify
the median voter’s type. Agents can be ranked according to their type, with
low-income taxpayers choosing larger sizes. The median voter is the type-ymτ
taxpayer who divides the electorate in halves. For a given level of enforcement,
e, we identify her most preferred tax rate as τmτ (e).
Next, consider voting over the level of tax enforcement. The level of tax
enforcement chosen by a type y taxpayer, given a personal income tax rate τ ,
is characterized by the following lemma:
Lemma 3. The most preferred enforcement level by any type-y individual is
e (τ) =
[(
1 + δ
1 + γ
)(
τ1+γ
κ (1 + γ)
)1/γ ((1 + γ
γ
)
y˜ − y
)] γ1+γ(1+η)+δ
. (8)
The preferred enforcement level is decreasing in y, i.e. ∂e(τ)∂y < 0 and increasing
in τ , i.e. ∂e(τ)∂τ > 0.
Lemma 3 establishes that each taxpayer is interested in supporting a posi-
tive level of tax enforcement. To understand this result, consider the different
ways of how tax enforcement affects the redistributive program: on the one
hand, a higher level of tax enforcement increases public costs and thus lowers
the portion of revenues devoted to income transfers. On the other hand, how-
ever, stricter enforcement reduces tax avoidance which in turn increases public
9
revenues. In order to see which effect prevails, we maximize the total amount
of public revenues net of enforcement costs (Eq. 5) with respect to e
ê : argmax
e
g; ê =
[(
1 + δ
1 + γ
)(
τ1+γ
κ(1 + γ)
)1/γ (1 + γ
γ
)
y˜
] γ
1+γ(1+η)+δ
(9)
which implies (by comparing equations (8) and (9)) that the net effect of tax
enforcement on public revenues is positive. Consequently, taxpayers have an
incentives to support a positive level of tax enforcement.13
Furthermore, Lemma 3 states that the preferred enforcement level is decreas-
ing with taxpayers’ income. The reason is that a higher level of enforcement
increases the marginal cost of avoidance and thus lowers the total amount of
avoided taxes. As this latter effect is more pronounced for richer taxpayers, the
resulting increase in the effective contribution is also relatively larger for these
individuals. Therefore, high income individuals suffer from a larger increase in
the total effective cost of paying taxes, i.e.
∂C
∂e
= (1 + δ)
γe
(
τ
κ(1 + γ)e1+δ
)1/γ
y = (1 + δ)
γ
a
e
≥ 0 and ∂
(
∂C
∂e
)
∂y
> 0
and thus vote for a lower level of tax enforcement.
Finally, a higher tax rate not only increases public revenues and hence the
total amount available to distribute between transfers and enforcement expen-
ditures but also the incentives to avoid taxes which tends to decrease public
revenues. Given that the first effect dominates14, taxpayers decide to devote a
portion of the increase in public revenues to enhance the level of tax enforce-
ment with the objective of reducing the higher level of tax avoidance and thus
to expand the level of public revenues even further.
13Since taxpayers are the contributors to the program, however, they will not support the
revenue maximizing level of tax enforcement. In fact, e (τ) < ê ∀y.
14We can define
τ̂ : arg max
τ
Ω = τ y˜
(
1−
(
τ
κ(1 + γ)e1+δ
)1/γ)
τ̂ = κ(1 + γ)e1+δ
(
1( 1+γ
γ
))γ
which implies that public revenue is increasing the size of the tax rate up to the level τ̂ and
consequently, the positive direct effect of a higher tax rate on public revenues overcomes the
negative effect due to the increase in the tax avoidance.
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Following the previous lemma, we can now order the votes on the enforce-
ment level according to the voters’ types. The median voter is the low-income
type-yme, who divides the electorate in halves. For a given size of the transfer
program, τ , we identify her most preferred level of tax enforcement as eme(τ).
As the size of the votes for both variables is monotonic in income, the median
voter’s type is the same in both dimensions, i.e. yme = ymτ = ym and thus
τmτ (e) = τm(e) and eme(τ) = em(τ).
4.2. Characterization of Politico-economic Equilibria
Since preferences are single peaked, we can now apply Shepsle (1979)’s result,
and characterize the structure induced equilibria:
Proposition 1. There exists a structure induced equilibrium, (τ∗, e∗), of the
voting game, such that:
(A) (τ∗ = 0, e∗ = 0) if ym > y˜; (10)
(B)
τ∗ = ((m1m 1γ2 )(1+δ)m1+η2
) 1
η−δ
, e∗ =
(
m1m
1+γ
γ
2
) 1
η−δ
 if ym < y˜
(11)
with
m1 =
(
1 + δ
1 + γ
)(
1
κ(1 + γ)
)1/γ ((1 + γ
γ
)
y˜ − ym
)
(12)
m2 = κ(1 + γ)
 y˜ − ym(
1+γ
γ
)
y˜ − ym
γ (13)
No redistributive program will exist if the median voter is a high-income
taxpayer (case A). In this case, the level of tax enforcement will be zero as the
median voter is not willing to support the system. If, however, a poorer median
voter appears, then a redistributive program with a positive level of enforcement
will exist (case B).15 In the following, we concentrate on the latter, empirically
relevant case.
15Note that the existence of an interior equilibrium further requires δ 6= η which we assume
to hold throughout the remaining analysis.
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We now proceed to analyze how the type of the median voter affects to the
size of both the tax rate of the redistributive program and the enforcement level.
Proposition 2. For a structure induced equilibrium, (τ∗, e∗), of the voting
game, an increase in the income inequality (a decrease in the type of the median
voter, ym) generates a new equilibrium, (τ∗∗, e∗∗), with two possible results:
(i) Lower redistribution : τ∗∗ < τ∗ and e∗∗ < e∗ ⇔ δ > η (14)
(ii) Higher redistribution : τ∗∗ > τ∗ and e∗∗ > e∗ ⇔ δ < η (15)
When inequality increases and ym declines, the tax rate and the tax en-
forcement level may increase or decrease depending exclusively on the relative
strength of the cost parameters. We label the two cases Lower redistribution
(LR) and Higher redistribution (HR), respectively. There are several offsetting
effects: first, the new median voter at τ -dimension decides to vote for a higher
tax rate since the effective cost of paying taxes decreases for poorer taxpayers
(see Lemma 2). This is the standard political effect implying a larger extent of
redistribution and, as a consequence, a higher level of tax avoidance. Second,
the poorer median voter at e-dimension chooses a higher level of tax enforce-
ment in order to reduce the level of tax avoidance (see Lemma 3). However, as
tax enforcement is costly, a higher level of tax enforcement requires more public
resources and, as a consequence, the amount of redistribution that could be
financed with the same income tax rate will be smaller. This negative tax-base
effect reduces the incentive of the poorer median voter to support higher tax
rates. Furthermore, a lower tax rate decreases the level of tax enforcement (ac-
cording to Lemma 3). As a result, these indirect effects are running counter to
the direct effects and the net effect on the tax rate and tax enforcement is am-
biguous.16 Results will depend on the technology of producing tax enforcement,
16In fact, it is easy to prove that the net effect on the aggregate level of tax avoidance
resulting from an increase in income inequality turns out to be positive: let a˜ be the aggregate
amount of tax avoidance
a˜ =
(
τ
κ(1 + γ)e1+δ
)1/γ
y˜. (16)
In equilibrium, we have
a˜∗ =
(
m2
κ(1 + γ)
)1/γ
y˜ =
(
y˜ − ym( 1+γ
γ
)
y˜ − ym
)
y˜
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η, and the efficiency of tax enforcement in controlling tax avoidance, δ:
• The lower η, the higher is the elasticity of tax enforcement with respect to
the public costs of producing it. In this case, a reduction of the amount
of resources devoted to tax enforcement (e.g. in order to increase the
amount of resources devoted to redistribution) would imply a substantial
decrease in the level of tax enforcement. As a result, the level of tax
avoidance would increase dramatically, which in turn lowers the amount
of disposable resources. Thus, maintaining a certain level of tax enforce-
ment in controlling tax avoidance would require a considerable amount of
available tax revenue, thereby reducing strongly the disposable amount of
resources devoted to redistribution.
• The higher δ, the higher is the elasticity of the level of tax avoidance with
respect to the level of tax enforcement. In this case, a reduction of the
amount of resources devoted to tax enforcement would imply a decrease in
the enforcement level and thus a considerably increase in the level of tax
avoidance. Consequently, maintaining a certain level of tax avoidance in
this setting, would require a considerable amount of available tax revenue,
which in turn substantially lowers the scope of income redistribution.
Therefore, low levels of η and high levels of δ imply large sizes of the indirect
effects, this is, a substantial decrease in the tax base.
Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of our results. For both cases (LR)
and (HR) we first plot the initial reaction functions of each political dimension,
τ(e) and e(τ) (Eqs. (7) and (8), respectively). These reaction functions, in turn,
determine the initial equilibrium, (τ∗, e∗). Furthermore, we calculate τ(e), the
inverse of reaction function e(τ), which is
τ(e) =
[
1
m1
] γ
1+γ
e
1+γ(1+η)+δ
1+γ
with
∂a˜∗
∂ym
< 0.
Thus, the positive effect of the tax rate on the aggregate level of tax avoidance outweighs the
negative effect through an increase in the level of tax enforcement.
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Figure 1: The effect of an increase in inequality; Cases HR (left) and LR (right).
To illustrate the existence of the two cases, we then determine the ratio of both
reaction functions:
τ(e)
τ(e) =
m2e
1+δ[
1
m1
] γ
1+γ
e
1+γ(1+η)+δ
1+γ
= m2m
γ
1+γ
1 e
γ(δ−η)
1+γ
where
∂
(
τ(e)
τ(e)
)
∂e
= m2m
γ
1+γ
1 e
γ(δ−η)
1+γ −1 γ(δ − η)
1 + γ
Therefore, we observe that this ratio is increasing or decreasing depending on
the relative size of δ and η:
∂
(
τ(e)
τ(e)
)
∂e
> 0⇔ δ > η ⇔ τ(e) > τ(e) ∀e > e∗
∂
(
τ(e)
τ(e)
)
∂e
< 0⇔ δ < η ⇔ τ(e) < τ(e) ∀e > e∗
Once we have defined the two types of initial equilibria, it is easy to analyze
the consequences of an increase in inequality (a decrease in ym). In both cases,
reaction function τ(e) moves to the left while reaction function τ(e) moves to
the right. These movement are the direct effects. However, in the left panel
of Figure 1, we observe that the resulting new equilibrium (τ∗∗, e∗∗) implies
higher levels of both tax rate and tax enforcement, case (HR), whereas in the
right panel of Figure 1 we observe the opposite, case (LR).
Summarizing, the different reactions to a rise in the mean-to-median income
ratio can be rationalized in a simple majority voting model with tax avoidance
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and costly tax enforcement. Thus, when generalized to a bidimensional issue
space, i.e. voting over taxes and the level of enforcement, simple majority-
voting models of redistribution are not rejected by empirically observed nega-
tive relations between the mean-to-median income ratio and income taxation.
In particular, our model highlights the importance of behavioral responses re-
lated to taxation and changes in the level of tax enforcement: if increases in
income inequality are accompanied by an increase in tax avoidance activities,
especially by rich individuals, poor individuals vote for higher levels of costly
tax enforcement. These non-standard effects reduce the size of the redistribu-
tive income program and may thus cause the mean-to-median income ratio and
redistribution to move in opposite directions, in contrast to the Meltzer-Richard
hypothesis.
5. Empirical application
How do the predictions of our model relate to real-world observations? As
has been emphasized by Bredemeier (2013), the first Reagan tax cut is a major
anomaly to the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis. Shortly after the Reagan admin-
istration was elected in 1980, personal income taxes were reduced substantially
in the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) of 1981. By contrast, the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1993 seems to be consistent with the
findings of Meltzer-Richard. Personal income taxes were increased shortly after
the Clinton administration came into office in early 1993. Both tax reforms
occurred at a time when the mean-to-median ratio of the US pre-tax income
distribution has been rising steadily (see, e.g., Rodriguez (1999) or Esteban
et al. (2007)).
In this section, we analyze whether the predictions of our model can help
explaining the opposing outcomes of the tax reforms. Clearly, confronting the
model with data is difficult as there are no direct estimates of the tax avoidance
and cost parameters. Still, there are ways of comparing the model predictions
with real-world observations.
As can be inferred from Figure 2, for example, the costs of tax collection
(which can be interpreted as a proxy of the enforcement level e) steadily de-
creased from 0.55 cents in 1976 to 0.41 cents in 1981. Over the same time period,
the gross personal income tax gap increased from 22.0 to 60.1 billion dollars.
Consequently, the increase in income inequality at the end of the 70s and early
80s was accompanied by an increase in tax avoidance (and tax evasion), a lower
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Figure 2: Gross individual income tax gap (in $ billions) (left) and costs of collecting $ 100
(right). Source: Internal Revenue Service - Tax Statistics (www.irs.gov/uac/Tax-Stats-2)
level of tax enforcement and a lower tax rate in line with the predictions of our
model. More precisely, we have defined this outcome as the Lower redistribution
(LR) case (see proposition 2). Considering the Clinton tax increase, however,
we observe an increase in the costs of tax collections since the late 80s (from
0.49 cents in 1987 to 0.60 cents in 1993) as well as an increase in the tax gap
(from 69.1 to 91.0 billion dollars). Therefore, in this second case, the increase
in income inequality was accompanied by an increase in tax avoidance, a higher
level of tax enforcement and a higher tax rate. We call this outcome the Higher
redistribution (HR) case. As a result, according to our model, the tax base effect
seemed to dominate in the early 1980s whereas the direct political effect was
the predominant force in the early 1990s.
Our theory states that the existence of these two consecutive tax reforms
with opposite effects in the tax rate and the enforcement level is related to
changes in the relationship between the parameters η and δ. The main question
is then whether there is (indirect) evidence on changes in the relative sizes of
these parameters over time.
As has been noted in subsection 4.2, the parameter η, for example, is in-
versely related to the elasticity of tax enforcement with respect to public costs
of producing it. Thus, the lower the size of η, the higher the elasticity. This
implies that a small amount of public revenues devoted to increase the enforce-
ment level would have large effects. Consequently, we consider a low level of η to
be consistent with a tax system characterized by being not well organized, with
poorly experienced officers, etc. In this type of tax systems with a low level of
efficiency, there exist large opportunities to increase the enforcement level with
relative low efforts. By contrast, when the tax system is well established, has
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reached a certain level of maturity, experience, organization, etc., more public
resources devoted to increase tax enforcement should have a less pronounced
effect. The idea is that the level of enforcement is already sufficiently high so
that further increases would require a considerable amount of resources. Alter-
natively, if the amount of public revenues devoted to tax enforcement decreases,
the level of tax enforcement decreases as well but relatively less than in the case
in which the tax system is more inefficient.
Thus, the magnitude of η is crucial to determine the type of equilibrium
that results from voting on the tax rate and the enforcement level (see proposi-
tion 2). According to our model, the larger the size of η and the lower the size
of δ, the lower is the tax-base effect, and so the resulting equilibrium would be
characterized by higher tax rates and enforcement levels.
If we look at the recent history of the US tax system, we observe that, in fact,
in the late 1980s, there was one major tax reform, the Tax Reform Act of 1986
(TRA), which drastically simplified the income tax code and broadened the tax
base. As we have argued above, this improvement in the efficiency of the tax
system can be interpreted as an increase in the parameter η. Such a change in
the size of η, in turn, would explain why before the TRA, the Reagan’s reform
was characterized by a tax cut and a lower enforcement level but, after the
TRA and its consequent improvement on the tax system efficiency and increase
in the tax-base, the Clinton’s tax reform was characterized by tax increase and
a higher enforcement level.
Overall, the model thus seems to be consistent with real world observations,
though, of course, our results should be interpreted with caution given the
crudeness of the measures used.
6. Conclusions
A benchmark result of the political economy of taxation is that the mean-
to-median income ratio and the degree of income redistribution are positively
linked. However, empirical evidence on this relationship remains inconclusive.
Changes in the mean-to-median income ratio are often accompanied by devel-
opments in redistribution going in the opposite direction.
This paper has proposed a simple model of tax avoidance and costly en-
forcement to explain these different empirical findings. We have shown that
increases in income inequality can lead to less redistribution. The key channel
for this non-standard result is a tax base effect that counteracts the standard
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mean-income effect. If taxpayers do not only vote over the size of the tax rate
but also over the level of tax enforcement, higher taxes increase the average
level of tax avoidance in the economy. This, in turn, decreases the tax base and
therefore the amount of redistribution that could be financed by a given level of
taxation. Due to this tax base effect, increases in income inequality can induce
a negative relation between the mean-to-median income ratio and the degree
of income redistribution. The overall effect, however, critically depends on the
sensitivity of public and private costs of taxation to changes in the enforcement
level.
Empirical evidence for the US lends support to our findings. In particular,
our model is able to explain why two major tax reforms, the Reagan tax cut in
1981 and the Clinton tax increase in 1993, have opposite sings. We suggest that
the efficiency gains of the tax system originating from the TRA in 1986 substan-
tially improved the effectiveness of tax enforcement which in turn broadened the
tax base and thus increased the amount of resources devoted to redistribution.
As a consequence, political support for higher tax rates and higher levels of
enforcements increased.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
For a type-y taxpayer, the first derivative of her indirect utility function, Eq.
(6), w.r.t. τ is
FOCyτ = −
y
γ
(
τ
κ(1 + γ)e1+δ
)1/γ
+ (y˜ − y)
(
1− 1 + γ
γ
(
τ
κ(1 + γ)e1+δ
)1/γ)
(17)
Thus, the second derivative w.r.t. τ is
SOCyτ = −
(
1
κ(1 + γ)e1+δ
)1/γ [
y
1 + γ + (y˜ − y)
]
Notice that SOCyτ is always negative if y <
(
1+γ
γ
)
y˜ and therefore, preferences
are single peaked in the τ dimension.
Similarly, the first derivative of her indirect utility function w.r.t. e is
FOCye =
(
1 + δ
γ
)(
τ
1 + γ
)(1+γ)/γ [y + (y˜ − y) (1 + γ)]
κ1/γ
e−(
1+γ+δ
γ ) − eη
and the SOCye is
SOCye = −
(1 + γ + δ) (1 + δ)
γ2
(
τ
1 + γ
)(1+γ)/γ [y + (y˜ − y) (1 + γ)]
κ1/γ
e−(
1+2γ+δ
γ )−ηeη−1
Since the last term is always negative, SOCye is negative if y <
(
1+γ
γ
)
y˜. This
condition guarantees that preferences are single peaked in the e dimension.
Proof of Lemma 2:
In the proof of Lemma 1 we have calculated the first derivative w.r.t. τ for a
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type-y taxpayer. Equating FOCyτ = 0 yields
0 = −y
γ
(
τ
κ(1 + γ)e1+δ
)1/γ
+ (y˜ − y)
(
1− 1 + γ
γ
(
τ
κ(1 + γ)e1+δ
)1/γ)
(18)
(y˜ − y) =
[
y
γ
(
1
κ(1 + γ)e1+δ
)1/γ
+ (y˜ − y)1 + γ
γ
(
1
κ(1 + γ)e1+δ
)1/γ]
τ1/γ(19)
(y˜ − y) =
[(
1 + γ
γ
)
y˜ − y
](
1
κ(1 + γ)e1+δ
)1/γ
τ1/γ (20)
and thus
τ = κ(1 + γ)e1+δ
 y˜ − y(
1+γ
γ
)
y˜ − y
γ
Therefore,
τ(e) = max
0, κ(1 + γ)e1+δ
 y˜ − y(
1+γ
γ
)
y˜ − y
γ (21)
If y˜ > y, it is easy to see that τ(e) > 0 and
∂τ(e)
∂y
= − y˜τ(e)
γ (y˜ − y)
((
1+γ
γ
)
y˜ − y
) < 0
∂τ(e)
∂e
= (1 + δ) τ(e)
e
> 0
Proof of Lemma 3:
From the proof of Lemma 1 we have calculated the first first derivative w.r.t. e
for a type-y taxpayer. If we equates FOCye = 0 we obtain that
0 =
(
1 + δ
γ
)(
τ
1 + γ
)(1+γ)/γ [y + (y˜ − y) (1 + γ)]
κ1/γ
e−(
1+γ+δ
γ ) − eη
eη+(
1+γ+δ
γ ) =
(
1 + δ
γ
)(
τ
1 + γ
)(1+γ)/γ [y + (y˜ − y) (1 + γ)]
κ1/γ
e =
[(
1 + δ
1 + γ
)(
τ1+γ
κ (1 + γ)
)1/γ ((1 + γ
γ
)
y˜ − y
)] γ1+γ(1+η)+δ
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It is easy to see that e > 0 ∀y since y ∈
(
y,
(
1+γ
γ
)
y˜
)
. Also, we have
∂e(τ)
∂y
= −
(
γ
1 + γ (1 + η) + δ
)
e(τ)((
1+γ
γ
)
y˜ − y
) < 0
∂e(τ)
∂τ
=
(
1 + γ
1 + γ (1 + η) + δ
)
e(τ)
τ
> 0
Proof of Proposition 1:
Case (A) is trivial since τ(e) = 0 ∀y > y˜ and e(τ = 0) = 0.
Case (B): The most preferred tax rate and enforcement level by the median
voter are defined by Eqs. (7) and (8) respectively. To simplify calculations, we
rewrite them as follows:
τ = e1+δm2 (22)
e =
[
τ
1+γ
γ m1
] γ
1+γ(1+η)+δ (23)
where
m1 =
(
1 + δ
1 + γ
)(
1
κ(1 + γ)
)1/γ ((1 + γ
γ
)
y˜ − ym
)
(24)
m2 = κ(1 + γ)
 y˜ − ym(
1+γ
γ
)
y˜ − ym
γ (25)
Then, substituting τ at e(τ) gives
e =
[
e
(1+δ)(1+γ)
γ m
(1+γ)
γ
2 m1
] γ
1+γ(1+η)+δ
(26)
⇔ e∗ =
(
m1m
1+γ
γ
2
) 1
η−δ
(27)
which in turn implies
τ∗ =
(
m1m
1+γ
γ
2
) (1+δ)
η−δ
m2 =
((
m1m
1
γ
2
)(1+δ)
m1+η2
) 1
η−δ
Proof of Proposition 2:
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Note that both m1 and m2 are decreasing in ym
∂m1
∂ym
= −
(
1 + δ
1 + γ
)(
1
κ(1 + γ)
)1/γ
< 0
∂m2
∂ym
= − κ(1 + γ)y˜((
1+γ
γ
)
y˜ − ym
)2
 y˜ − ym(
1+γ
γ
)
y˜ − ym
γ−1 < 0
We then have
∂e∗
∂ym
=
(
m1m
1+γ
γ
2
) 1
η−δ−1
η − δ
∂(m1m
1+γ
γ
2 )
∂ym
≷ 0 ⇔ η ≶ δ (28)
and similarly
∂τ∗
∂ym
=
((
m1m
1
γ
2
)(1+δ)
m1+η2
) 1
η−δ−1
η − δ
∂
((
m1m
1
γ
2
)(1+δ)
m1+η2
)
∂ym
≷ 0 ⇔ η ≶ δ
(29)
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